{"id":8464,"date":"2022-12-02T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-12-02T09:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.taxpolicy.org.uk\/?p=8464"},"modified":"2024-01-21T15:35:23","modified_gmt":"2024-01-21T15:35:23","slug":"sra_oc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/heacham.neidles.com\/2022\/12\/02\/sra_oc\/","title":{"rendered":"Nadhim Zahawi’s lawyers referred to regulator for abusing libel law to shut down debate"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
I reported in July that Nadhim Zahawi, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had founded YouGov using a tax avoidance structure. Zahawi provided an explanation which my detailed analysis<\/a> showed to be false. Zahawi then shifted immediately onto a different explanation. In my opinion this showed that his first explanation was a lie – and I said so<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Zahawi had a media profile and resources dwarfing a small tax think tank – but instead of using these to explain himself, he instructed Osborne Clarke to write to me demanding that I retract. And their letter claimed that I could not publish the letter, or even tell anyone I’d received it. It was an attempt to silence criticism<\/a> which had no basis in law<\/a>, and for which Zahawi and his lawyers should be ashamed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Solicitors Regulation Authority this week issued a “warning notice<\/a>” making clear that this kind of behaviour is unacceptable. I have therefore referred Zahawi\u2019s lawyers, Osborne Clarke, to the regulator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I’m also asking the SRA to investigate Osborne Clarke more widely. In the end, their actions cost me some legal fees but otherwise failed. But I know there are many others, without my legal background, contacts or financial resources, who have received letters like this (on behalf of Zahawi and others) and been silenced. If the SRA find that people have been silenced by deception and intimidation, then this needs to be put right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I’ve copied below the text of my letter, with links to the referenced documents. If you prefer a PDF, that is here<\/a> (but without links).<\/p>\n\n\n\n And more on Mr Zahawi coming soon…<\/p>\n\n\n\n SRA General Counsel<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Cube<\/p>\n\n\n\n 199 Wharfside Street <\/p>\n\n\n\n Birmingham B1 1RN <\/p>\n\n\n\n 1 December 2022<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sent by email<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dear Ms Oliver<\/p>\n\n\n\n Osborne Clarke \u2013 SLAPP – breach of SRA Principles<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. Many thanks for your publication on 28 November 2022 of the new warning notice on SLAPPs. In light of that notice, I wish to make a formal referral to you of Osborne Clarke for several significant breaches of SRA Principles. I believe you will be already aware of a number of the breaches, but you may not be aware of others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. I retired from commercial practice in May 2022, and founded Tax Policy Associates; a think tank which works to improve both tax policy and the public understanding of tax. In July 2022, I wrote several articles and social media posts about Nadhim Zahawi. At that time, Mr Zahawi was the Chancellor of the Exchequer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. The essence of my writings was that, when Mr Zahawi founded YouGov in 2000, the founder shares (which ordinarily would have been issued to Mr Zahawi) were instead issued to a Gibraltar company, Balshore Investments Limited. I said this looked like tax avoidance. Mr Zahawi\u2019s team responded by briefing several journalists that the reason for Balshore receiving the shares (which I will call the \u201cfirst explanation\u201d) was that Mr Zahawi\u2019s father, who owned Balshore, had contributed startup capital to YouGov. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 4. I investigated the accounts and Companies House filings and found that the startup capital was contributed by another investor, Neil Copp. Balshore had contributed only a token amount (\u00a37,215). I therefore wrote that either I was mistaken, the filings were wrong, or Mr Zahawi was lying. The key Twitter thread can be found at https:\/\/heacham.neidles.com\/evidence<\/a> (attached in PDF format as tweet1.pdf<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5. Immediately after this, Mr Zahawi\u2019s team started briefing a different explanation (which I will call the \u201csecond explanation\u201d): that Mr Zahawi\u2019s father received the shares in recognition of the significant advice and assistance he had provided to the business. The fact that Mr Zahawi was no longer defending his first explanation suggested to me that I had not made a mistake; in my opinion it suggested that the first explanation had been a lie. I said so. I did not say that the second explanation (\u201cadvice and assistance\u201d) was a lie (although it seemed highly implausible). The key Twitter thread can be found at https:\/\/heacham.neidles.com\/lying<\/a> (attached as tweet2.pdf<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6. On Saturday 16 July 2022, I received an unsolicited direct message on Twitter from Ashley Hurst, a partner at Osborne Clarke (see attachment SRA1<\/a>). Mr Hurst sought to speak to me on a without prejudice basis. I responded that he should put what he had to say in writing, and that I did not accept without prejudice correspondence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 7. Later that day I received an email from Mr Hurst (see attachment SRA2<\/a>) asking me to retract my accusation by the end of that day, or I would receive an open letter on Monday.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 8. I did not retract. On Tuesday 19 July I received a letter from Mr Hurst (see attachment SRA3<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n Breaches of SRA Principles<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 9. The Osborne Clarke correspondence bears several of the hallmarks of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) which are identified in your warning notice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Labelling<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 10. The email (SRA2<\/a>) is marked \u201cconfidential and without prejudice\u201d. It says:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI have marked this email without prejudice because it is a confidential and genuine attempt to resolve a dispute with you before further damage is caused. Our client wants to give you the opportunity to retract your allegation of lies in relation to our client.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n That would not of course stop you from raising questions based on facts as you see them.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n You have said that you will \u201cnot accept\u201d without prejudice correspondence. It is up to you whether you respond to this email but you are not entitled to publish it or refer to it other than for the purposes of seeking legal advice. That would be a serious matter as you know. We recommend that you seek advice from libel lawyer if you have not done already.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 11. However, the letter cannot possibly be \u201cwithout prejudice\u201d, for three (independent) reasons. First, I had specifically told Osborne Clarke I would not accept \u201cwithout prejudice\u201d correspondence. Second, even if I hadn\u2019t done so, their email was not a genuine attempt to resolve an existing dispute \u2013 it offered no concessions, and was therefore not an attempt at settlement. Third, there was no dispute \u2013 as became subsequently clear, Mr Zahawi never had any intention of instigating a claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 12. The claims that the email SRA2<\/a> and subsequent letter SRA3<\/a> were confidential were equally false. The content of the email and letter lacked the quality of confidence (as all the information in the documents was already public or obvious). There was nothing in our relationship which suggested that a duty of confidence could be imputed to me \u2013 the letter was unsolicited. Even if the letter had contained confidential information, there was a clear public interest in the matters under discussion (which would override the duty of confidence).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 13. Hence the claims that the email was \u201cwithout prejudice\u201d and the email and letter were \u201cconfidential\u201d were without merit, an attempt to mislead, and a breach of the SRA Principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Aggressive and intimidating threats<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 14. The email asserts that the \u201cwithout prejudice\u201d rule prevents me from publishing or even referring to the letter. This is entirely false. It is often tactically unwise for a party to publish without prejudice correspondence, but the \u201cwithout prejudice\u201d rule is a rule of evidence and does not prevent publication. This was, again, false, and an attempt to mislead. However, it is more serious than that: it is an aggressive and intimidating threat (\u201cThat would be a serious matter as you know.\u201d). <\/p>\n\n\n\n 15. The second Osborne Clarke communication, SRA3<\/a>, also seeks to intimidate me into not publishing the letter. It asserts that doing so would be \u201cimproper\u201d (paragraph 1.3) but does not give a legal rationale for this claim \u2013 most likely because there is no such rationale. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Advancing meritless claims \u2013 false allegations<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 16. As you identify in your warning notice, a common characteristic of SLAPP pre-action correspondence is that it advances meritless legal claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 17. The entirety of the first Osborne Clarke email (SRA2<\/a>) is meritless. The central allegation is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cYou have relied on comments attributed to YouGov by The Times today to support your view that our client was lying about the extent of involvement of our client\u2019s father in the very early days of YouGov when it was set up in 2000.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n 18. This misrepresents the comments I had made. I had specifically alleged that Mr Zahawi lied when he claimed that his father provided startup capital to YouGov (his first explanation). I did not allege that Mr Zahawi\u2019s subsequent explanation was a lie (the second explanation \u2013 that Balshore Investments acquired its shareholding because Mr Zahawi\u2019s father was so involved in the running of the business).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 19. It is hard to imagine a more meritless defamation action than complaining about an allegation that was not in fact made. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 20. The Osborne Clarke email (SRA2<\/a>) at no point attempts to respond to my actual allegation. The closest it comes is by saying I omitted to reference that Mr Zahawi\u2019s father paid \u00a37,000 for his second tranche of shares. But I clearly did mention this, in both my Twitter thread (https:\/\/heacham.neidles.com\/evidence<\/a>) and my longer article (https:\/\/heacham.neidles.com\/zahawi-capital\/<\/a>). The lack of attention Osborne Clarke paid to the facts evidences recklessness and\/or a lack of interest in the merits of the case, both of which are identified in the SRA \u201cconduct in disputes\u201d guidance as unacceptable behaviour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Advancing meritless claims \u2013 no legal basis<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 21. Your risk warning specifically mentions cases where a solicitor pursues a claim despite knowing that a legal defence to their claim will be successful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 22. At the time, Nadhim Zahawi was Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is hard to imagine a topic of higher public interest than an accusation that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had avoided tax and lied about it. Hence Osborne Clarke would have known that a public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 would likely have been successful. It is notable that their communications do not mention the public interest defence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Advancing false factual claims<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 23. Another common element of SLAPP pre-action letters is for the solicitor to advance factual claims by their client which are false, and which the solicitor should know are likely false. As your guidance notes, solicitors should take reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that a claim is properly arguable before putting it forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 24. In this instance, both Osborne Clarke communications (SRA2<\/a> and SRA3<\/a>) assert that Balshore provided \u00a37,000 of startup capital for the YouGov shares it acquired in 2000. See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of SRA3<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 25. However, the Companies House form for the share issuance shows that it was signed in October 2002, but backdated to 2000 (see attachment SRA8<\/a>). My review of YouGov\u2019s accounts and other Companies House filings confirm that the \u00a37,000 was paid in 2002, not 2000 (I can supply evidence of this if that would be helpful).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 26. Hence the key factual component of the Osborne Clarke letters was false. Osborne Clarke cannot have made any attempt to verify the matter (given that a cursory review of the Companies House form would have immediately revealed the backdating).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 27. There is no duty on a solicitor to conduct detailed due diligence to fully investigate a client\u2019s factual assertions. However, where the solicitor is going to assert factual matters in a letter to a third party, as a central part of a threatened claim against the third party, the solicitor should have some proper basis for doing so. The solicitor\u2019s duty to the third party and the rule of law mean that the solicitor cannot simply advance any factual assertion made by his or her client, without the slightest investigation. A solicitor is not a mere post-box, particularly when serious allegations of defamation are being made. The failure of Osborne Clarke to make any checks on the claim was reckless and a breach of the SRA Principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 28. The breach subsequently became more serious. I drew Osborne Clarke\u2019s attention to the falsehood of the \u00a37,000 claim, but (now knowing it was likely false) they did not correct the record. At that point Osborne Clarke became complicit in misleading me. I discuss this further below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No intention of actually commencing litigation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 29. A further common characteristic of SLAPPs (mentioned in your guidance) is where a solicitor is acting in a public relations capacity, with a legal veneer but no actual legal content. One example of this is where a solicitor makes a threat of a defamation lawsuit which is a \u201cbluff\u201d. The solicitor and client have no intention of filing an actual defamation claim, either because the client\u2019s case is too weak (for example because the honest opinion or public interest defences will apply), or because the claimant would not want to run the risk of pre-trial disclosure or cross-examination during trial. The solicitor therefore engages in purported pre-action correspondence with the aim of intimidating the recipient into withdrawing their accusation. This is abusive behaviour, damaging to the rule of law. When combined with mislabelling, the overall effect is that people are silenced, with no way for the public or the judicial system to ever know about it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 30. It will often be hard to judge whether a solicitor\u2019s correspondence falls within this category. This, however, is an unusual case where we can be confident that it does. The key sentence in Osborne Clarke\u2019s email (SRA2<\/a>) reads:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cShould you not retract your allegation of lies today, we will write to you more fully on an open basis on Monday.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 31. The natural reading of this is that, if I did not retract, Osborne Clarke would send me a pre-action letter, with a view to subsequently commencing defamation proceedings. However when I did not retract, I did not receive a pre-action letter. Osborne Clarke\u2019s subsequent letter (SRA3<\/a>) is explicit that it is \u201cnot a threat to sue for libel\u201d. And when I still did not retract, I received no further correspondence (and no libel claim has been forthcoming).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 32. Hence, the evidence suggests that Osborne Clarke was bluffing: this was pre-action correspondence as an end itself \u2013 a SLAPP, and a breach of the SRA Principles. It was, perhaps, not pre-action correspondence at all \u2013 but Osborne Clarke acting in a \u201creputation management\u201d\/\u201cpublic relations\u201d capacity of the kind that your 28 November warning identifies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 33. It may be that, if you review Osborne Clarke\u2019s files, you will find that Mr Zahawi had told Osborne Clarke he had no intention of commencing proceedings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reason for writing<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 34. I had not intended to make a formal complaint about Osborne Clarke. However, their behaviour since I called their \u201cbluff\u201d has evidenced a serious misunderstanding of a solicitor\u2019s professional duties and obligations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n 35. I wrote to Osborne Clarke on 19 August 2022 (attachment SRA4<\/a>) alerting them to the fact that their central claim about the \u00a37,000 was false, and inviting them to correct the record. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 36. Their response on 25 August 2022 did not address the point (attachment SRA5<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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