{"id":12281,"date":"2023-11-09T10:37:19","date_gmt":"2023-11-09T10:37:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.taxpolicy.org.uk\/?p=12281"},"modified":"2024-01-22T21:05:28","modified_gmt":"2024-01-22T21:05:28","slug":"badly","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/heacham.neidles.com\/2023\/11\/09\/badly\/","title":{"rendered":"What’s worse than a tax avoidance scheme? A badly implemented tax avoidance scheme."},"content":{"rendered":"\n
We’ve reviewed multiple Property118 client files to investigate how they implement their tax avoidance scheme. We’ve found that the scheme is implemented so badly that our previous criticism is beside the point – a key drafting error means that the scheme fails immediately. It also appears that their clients receive templated \u201cadvice\u201d which fails to identify key issues, or warn clients about the legal and tax risks they are running.<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n We’ve been reporting on a tax avoidance scheme promoter<\/a> called “Property118”, which has sold over 1,000 tax avoidance schemes to landlords. The essence of the scheme is to obtain the tax benefits of incorporating a property rental business without the usual tax and commercial downsides. The scheme involves artificial steps with no purpose other than tax avoidance<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We previously concluded that the structure had significant technical flaws<\/a> which meant that it likely did not work. However, this analysis assumed the structure was correctly implemented. It isn’t. We have now reviewed complete sets of Property118 advice and documentation, and there are very significant failings in both legal implementation and in Property118’s advice.1<\/a><\/sup>It’s relevant to note that a court or tribunal would not necessarily approach the Property118 structure point by point, in the way that we have analysed in our reports. In a recent podcast discussion on the Property118 structure, Patrick Way KC made the important point that, when a structure looks like tax avoidance, the modern judicial approach is to find against it on principled grounds and not undertake the full technical analysis.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n We explain these points further below. <\/p>\n\n\n\n If Property118 have really sold their scheme 1,000 times, and the documents are as standardised as they appear to be, then all 1,000 schemes will have failed. Not just failed because of the technical analysis<\/a> in our previous article, but failed because of incompetent implementation. We believe many of the clients entered into the scheme on the basis of assurances about Mark Smith’s insurance which were false.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the scale of the problem, we believe it’s important that taxpayers and HMRC resolve these issues now, rather than years later, when the situation could become a loan charge-style crisis<\/a>. We will also be asking the Bar Standards Board to investigate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As ever, we will promptly correct any errors of fact or law that are identified; however we will not withdraw any statement we make because of threats of defamation proceedings<\/a>, childish<\/a> insults<\/a> or vague and generic articles<\/a> that fail to address our specific points.<\/p>\n\n\n Central to the Property118 scheme<\/a> is that the landlords declare a trust over their rental properties in favour of a newly incorporated company. Here’s the description of the deed of trust in Mark Smith’s advice:<\/p>\n\n\n\n So this is intended to be a “bare trust” – the company\/beneficiary holds absolutely and the landlords are mere trustees. The company would then be taxed more-or-less as if it held the properties directly. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The first operative clause in the trust deed intends to achieve that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n But then, three clauses later, we see this::<\/p>\n\n\n\n This clause has astonished every lawyer who’s seen it. It enables the landlords\/trustees to reacquire the property for no payment – but that’s entirely incompatible with a bare trust, where beneficiary absolutely owns the property.2<\/a><\/sup>This is the only meaning we can see “vest absolutely and immediately in the Trustees” can have. It is unclear what “in accordance with their various legal and equitable interests” means, given that a trustee obviously has no equitable interest. Possibly it means that the Trustee takes the same % beneficial ownership as they had before the trust was originally declared. We have spoken to a range of trust and trust tax experts, and we believe there are three principal possibilities:3<\/a><\/sup>James Robertson added another point we missed in our initial analysis: the potential for an up-front market value CGT charge under s284 TCGA (sale with a right to reconveyance). The interaction between the different provisions would require considerable thought, but likely there would be only one up-front market value CGT charge, whether under the settlement rules, s284 or on the grant of an option.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The first two scenarios result in an up-front capital gains tax charge as if the properties were sold for market value5<\/a><\/sup>The grant of an option is immediately subject to CGT<\/a>. As the parties are connected, the consideration will be deemed to be market value<\/a>, and the market value of an option to acquire the properties at any time for free will be (broadly speaking) the current market value of the properties. The transfer of property to a settlement triggers an immediate CGT charge at current market value.<\/a><\/span> A settlement would also give rise to complex ongoing tax issues.6<\/a><\/sup>Including the settlor interested trust rules<\/a> effectively reversing any potential income tax benefit, and a 6% inheritance tax charge every ten years<\/a>. Possibly also a 20% entry charge, and the application of the gifts with reservation of benefit rules, although this would need a careful analysis which we have not undertaken. If a settlement arises then it would have to be registered with the Trust Registration Service<\/a>. Mark Smith takes the view<\/a> that the intended “bare trust” is not registrable – we are not sure that is correct, but it’s irrelevant if in fact the trust is not bare.<\/span>. The third scenario might be a welcome one, as possibly it provides a way to take the position that the whole transaction had no effect.7<\/a><\/sup>This would, however, need careful thought. It would be very inadvisable and perhaps improper to simply proceed on this basis without detailed and case-specific legal analysis.<\/span> In all three scenarios there is no possibility of the company claiming a tax deduction for mortgage interest, because you don’t “look through” a settlement in the way you look through a bare trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, regardless of which of these three scenarios apply, none result in the structure intended by Property118 and Cotswold Barristers. The scheme is dead on arrival, and our previous analysis of the structure<\/a> is no longer necessary (or indeed relevant);8<\/a><\/sup>i.e. because our previous analysis was on the assumption that Property118 correctly implemented their structure. We also note that, when Property118 briefly hired a tax KC in an attempt to threaten us with a libel suit<\/a>, it seems likely that she did not review the transaction documents, as she said specifically that her views were on the basis that the structure was “properly implemented” – see paragraph 13 here<\/a>. The KC did add that she had reviewed client files, but we expect this was advice and correspondence with HMRC, not transaction documentation – if the KC had reviewed transaction documentation then we believe her opinion would have been very different.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not uncommon for tax avoidance schemes to fail because of incorrect implementation. For example, the Vardy<\/a><\/em> stamp duty\/SDLT avoidance scheme involved an unlimited company paying a dividend ‘in specie’ of the real estate itself, and claiming that the dividend was outside SDLT. This was probably destined to fail, but it didn’t even get that far. The dividend wasn’t properly declared and was unlawful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So far as we are aware, on the basis of the Property118 documents we’ve reviewed and the documents reviewed by advisers we’ve spoken to, this error is present in all Property118 documentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We do not believe a reasonably competent tax lawyer would have drafted a trust deed in this manner – it is basic trust law that the beneficiary of a bare trust has an absolute entitlement to the trust property, and no other party has any entitlement. The drafting therefore suggests that Cotswold Barristers may have been negligent.<\/p>\n\n\n The central point of the structure is to solve the “section 24” limitation on landlords claiming mortgage interest tax relief. The idea is that the landlord continues making interest payments to the mortgage lender, but these are funded by the company, which can claim a tax deduction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here is how Mark Smith describes this in the “client care” letter he sends to accompany the draft documents:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The drafting to achieve this is a mess of confused and contradictory provisions.9<\/a><\/sup>In the interests of simplicity, this analysis in this section of our report ignores the first drafting error – the fact the trust is probably a settlement and not a bare trust. In reality the interaction of the two issues would need to be considered, and that is not at all straightforward.<\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n First, the Business Sale Agreement contains no indemnity. Instead it says:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The definition of “Liabilities” lists the outstanding mortgages. But law students usually learn in their first contract law class that English law doesn’t permit the purchase of liabilities. In some circumstances you can buy assets in consideration for an assumption of liabilities – but that won’t work here, because the mortgage lender won’t permit the company to assume the liabilities.10<\/a><\/sup>And is likely entirely unaware of the transaction.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The sale contract for the properties contradicts this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words, the landlords continue to owe the mortgage to the lender (as they must), but the company now owes an equivalent debt to the landlords. That is a sensible approach, but legally different from an indemnity. It creates an obligation for the company to pay a principal amount to the landlord, but doesn’t create any obligation for the company to cover the landlord’s interest payments<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are then three very confusing clauses:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First, an attorney\/delegation clause in the trust deed, under which the landlords appoint the company as their attorney to make interest payments on their behalf:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This normally won’t be permitted by the terms of the mortgage; only the borrower can make payments, and as a practical matter a lender would usually reject payments from another party. We don’t know why it’s included.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then an indemnity in the trust document:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Does this cover the landlord’s mortgage interest payments? Unclear.11<\/a><\/sup>Our team had different views. Some of us believe the clause could be read broadly, given that the trust anticipates the existence of the mortgages. Others don’t agree, because the mortgage payments are not “chargeable on the Property” (rather, they are personal obligations of the landlord), and the mortgage payments do not “arise out of the settlement” (also, what does “payable to them” mean? The word “to” looks like a typo, but it’s included in all the versions of this document we’ve seen).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n There is then an “agency agreement” with recitals as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unusually, recital B is the only operative term in the contract12<\/a><\/sup>Usually lawyers never put operative provisions into recitals, but where a contract is silent on a point, an operative provision in the recitals will be effective – see the old case of Aspdin v Austin<\/em> (1844).<\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n So, to recap: under the original mortgage, landlord has an obligation to pay interest to the mortgage lender. Under Clause 2.2 of the trust deed, the landlord delegates the making of these mortgage payments to the company. Under the agency agreement, the company then appoints the landlord as its agent to make the same payments – back where it started. We have no idea what the point of this is. Neither provision will have any tax effect – agency\/delegation doesn’t normally change the tax character of a payment (because a payment by an agent or delegate is, for most tax purposes, regarded as made by the principal).<\/p>\n\n\n\n It’s a mess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, landlords may be better off if these provisions don’t<\/strong> create an obligation for the company to make indemnity payments in respect of the mortgage interest. First, given the debt created by the sale contract, the payments are likely to be “interest”13<\/a><\/sup>The fact the indemnity payments are not termed “interest” in the documents is irrelevant (see the Re Euro Hotel<\/a> case) – economically they are interest on the principal amount created by the sale contract and therefore are interest for tax purposes (see Bennet v Ogston<\/a>). Probably they would not be interest even if there was no principal amount – our original view<\/a> (prior to having reviewed the document set) was that they would be either taxable annual payments or capital payments (i.e. sale consideration).<\/span> for tax purposes, subject to 20% withholding tax, and additional income tax in the hands of the landlord. Second, the payments are unlikely to be deductible for the company (they are probably not payments under a loan relationship; if they are, the existence of a tax main purpose means they will be non-deductible).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In our view, a reasonably competent lawyer would not have drafted such a web of contradictory and confused clauses.<\/p>\n\n\n As we will discuss below, Cotswold Barristers rarely provide any advice on any tax issue. One of the many issues they do not discuss is DOTAS – the rules requiring a promoter of a tax avoidance structure to disclose it to HMRC. <\/p>\n\n\n\n We criticised this<\/a> in our original analysis. Six weeks later, Mark Smith responded with an article that provided technical justification for a claim that DOTAS does not apply<\/a> (link is to an archived version; it’s no longer on the Property118 website). This is important, because it is the only technical analysis we or any of our sources have seen from Mark Smith, and it therefore lets us assess his competence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Smith’s article was reviewed by Ray McCann, a retired senior HMRC official. When Ray was at HMRC, he led the introduction of DOTAS. Ray described Smith’s article<\/a> as “hopelessly wrong”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Smith made the following serious mistakes, which call into question his basic competence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mark Smith’s analysis therefore contained a series of elementary but serious mistakes. We believe it was incompetent. If Smith’s article is the basis on which he concluded DOTAS didn’t apply, or indeed if he had never previously considered DOTAS, then in our opinion he fell well below the standard of a reasonable tax barrister, and was negligent. It also leads us to believe he is not competent to advise on tax.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Smith’s article was heavily criticised by Ray McCann and others. At some point Smith reacted to this by silently rewriting<\/a> his article, and removing the hopeless arguments that the scheme had no promoter and was an “in-house” scheme. Smith now relies upon three claims<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is therefore significantly less incompetent than Smith’s original article, but still contains bad errors of fact and law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The consequence of DOTAS applying is serious for Property118 and (if he is a promoter) Mark Smith – penalties of up to \u00a31m. There are also serious consequences for their clients: HMRC may have up to 20 years to investigate their tax affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n We recently reported<\/a> on the “hybrid partnership” scheme promoted by Less Tax for Landlords. HMRC has confirmed that the scheme does not work<\/a>, and should have been reported under DOTAS. Property118 seemed delighted with that outcome<\/a>, and said: <\/p>\n\n\n\n So it is surprising that Cotswold Barristers have endorsed a version of the same structure:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This slide has a series of errors:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The failure to consider subsection 17 was in our view incompetent. A reasonable adviser reading the legislation would surely not have made that mistake.20<\/a><\/sup>As an aside, Smith tends to refer almost exclusively to HMRC guidance, and in this case the first guidance appearing on Google<\/a> doesn’t mention the subsection 17 rule (probably because the guidance pre-dates the legislation). That is speculation; however it is notable that reliance on this out-of-date guidance<\/a> was one of Less Tax for Landlords’ big mistakes.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n Cotswold Barristers (which in practice means Mark Smith) advise their landlord client directly under the Bar’s public access scheme<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the claim made by Property118<\/a>:21<\/a><\/sup>The reference to HMRC manuals is curious – advisers should be advising on the basis of the law, particularly when a transaction is tax-motivated (as HMRC guidance cannot be relied upon in such circumstances).<\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n We have seen no evidence of any of this. The pattern we have seen, again and again, is that Property118 and Cotswold Barristers use standardised documents and provide highly standardised advice.22<\/a><\/sup>Which is why we are confident we will not reveal our sources by publishing extracts from Property118 advice and documentation<\/span> In the cases we have reviewed, the written advice consists of four standardised communications:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The client pays \u00a3400 for an initial consultation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n They then receive a document from a “tax consultant” at Property118 (not a lawyer, accountant or CIOT\/CTA qualified tax adviser) entitled “Incorporation and Smart Company structuring”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a glossy document setting out the proposed structure, in a standardised form, including recommendations almost identical to this:23<\/a><\/sup>Note in passing that “a discretionary trust controlled by you” is not how discretionary trusts can work if they are to be respected for inheritance tax purposes.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n It adds:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The document then sells the benefits of the structure, which are almost entirely tax benefits:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact there is an obvious tax “main purpose” means a multitude of anti-avoidance rules should be considered; there is no evidence they are considered at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The only tax advice contained in the document is a short and generic summary of CGT and SDLT relief upon incorporation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Cotswold Barristers confirmation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n If the client proceeds to instruct P118, they receive a letter from Mark Smith at Cotswold Barristers saying that he agrees with the recommendations in the initial proposal:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The letter then sets out a generic description of the structure and Smith’s terms of business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is no advice on any additional points beyond those in the original communication. We are not aware of any case where Mark Smith departs from the original Property118 advice – he appears to always “rubber stamp” the advice of the unqualified “tax consultant”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. Draft documents<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The client then receives draft transaction documents, plus a one page cover letter entitled “Model client care letter” written by Mark Smith of Cotswold Barristers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n It explains the documents but contains no advice on the tax consequences of the arrangement. We excerpted above the incorrect descriptions of the trust deed and business sale agreement. Similar short descriptions are provided of the other documents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4. Post-completion letter<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n After the documents are signed, Mark Smith sends the client another “client care letter” confirming that the transaction has completed. The letter contains a FAQ and an explanation of the structure for conveyancers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The letter is standardised, and it appears from the documents we have seen that only the salutation at the top of the page changes from client to client. The name of the new company is written as “(company name and number)”. The letter mentions the requirement to submit an ATED return “If any of the properties are worth more than \u00a3500,000”, even though Cotswold Barristers know that (in the cases we saw) they are worth significantly more than that. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The most hilarious example of standardisation is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n No advice is provided to the client in this letter.<\/p>\n\n\n It’s useful to look again at the original promises for the Property118 structure, made in the first communication:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Very little of this is covered by advice from Property118 or Cotswold Barristers. As far as we are aware, they never provide proper advice on the following key points:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Does the trust default the mortgage?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a hugely significant point for landlords. Property118 are very reassuring when making presentations<\/a>, but when it comes to specific clients we have seen no evidence of any advice on this point. Most of their clients have multiple mortgages over different properties. There is no evidence of any review of the mortgage T&Cs in either the original Property118 advice or the Mark Smith letters. Mark Alexander now seems to concede that the structure legally defaults their clients mortgages:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A “technical” breach of mortgage T&Cs will in most cases entitle the bank to call a default and demand repayment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Does CGT incorporation relief apply? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The first letter, from Property118, says it does, based upon a simple analysis of the facts. We would expect a barrister to then consider the technical analysis and, in particular, whether the fact legal title is not transferred means that there is a “sale of a business as a going concern”, and whether ESC D32 can be relied upon given that the transaction is tax-motivated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is no evidence of consideration of these points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cotswold Barristers make the serious error of advising clients to include incorrect disclosure in the client’s self assessment return:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is an entirely incorrect description of the sale agreement, because it is a sale in consideration for shares plus the assumption of debt. That is highly material, because on the face of the legislation it prevents incorporation relief from applying. Reliance could then be placed on an HMRC extra-statutory concession, but that isn’t available in tax avoidance cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The description also fails to mention that the business is not being sold conventionally, but rather a trust is being declared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most favourable interpretation is that this is a serious error. The less favourable interpretation is that this is intentionally providing incomplete disclosure to HMRC to avoid alerting HMRC to the fact that incorporation relief may not apply. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In any event, the intended incorporation relief position is of merely academic interest given that the trust appears to be a settlement, which means an up-front CGT charge with no prospect of relief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Does SDLT “partnership relief” apply?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Property118 and Cotswold Barristers claim that in many cases where a married couple jointly run a property rental business, they can retrospectively claim that a partnership always existed, and therefore incorporation benefits from SDLT rules that can provide relief for partnerships incorporating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Technically it is very doubtful<\/a> a partnership exists in most normal circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Property118 instructed a KC, in an abortive attempt to threaten us with defamation proceedings<\/a>, the KC said<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n We see no evidence of Property118 and Cotswold Barristers ever carrying out a fact specific analysis before the strategy is recommended. The “strategy” is always set out in the first standardised advice note prepared by Property118, before Cotswold Barristers are engaged, and before any substantive work is undertaken. We have not seen any evidence of any legal analysis of this point subsequently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can the company claim a tax deduction for the mortgage interest? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The first letter, from Property118 says it can (see the second tick mark in the excerpt above). But the basis for this is never explained (and, for the reasons we explain around the misdrafted indemnity, in fact the company can’t claim a deduction).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact the trust appears to be a settlement further complicates this; naturally none of the advice from Property118\/Cotswold Barristers considers that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Is it correct that the “growth shares” issued by the company have a valuation of zero?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Property118’s structure involves issuing “growth shares” which carry an entitlement to all future capital gains of the company. The claim is that they initially have a valuation of zero. That is highly questionable. However neither Property118 nor Cotswold Barristers appears to undertake any valuation exercise to justify the claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Does the “director loan” structure work?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n It’s the director loan which creates the “ability to draw down capital tax free”. It’s achieved using this astonishing structure<\/a> – a bridge loan that’s put in place for a few hours immediately prior to incorporation, and moves between two escrow accounts without ever being available to the landlord or their business. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In our view the structure prevents incorporation relief applying, with an additional risk that “loan repayments” become taxable. Cotswold Barristers provide no advice at all on the effect of the structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Does anti-avoidance legislation apply? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n There are a plethora of anti-avoidance rules that are engaged if, as here, a transaction has a “main purpose” or “main benefit” of obtaining a tax advantage: DOTAS, rules denying interest deductibility, GAAR, settlor-interested trust rules etc. Advisers would usually cover these issues even on simple and innocuous structures. We would also usually expect advisers to cover the Ramsay<\/a><\/em> common law anti-avoidance principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, there is no evidence that either Property118 or Cotswold Barristers have considered or advised on any of these issues. As we note above, Mark Smith’s DOTAS article demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the rules.24<\/a><\/sup>It is also notable that Mark Alexander, who runs Property118, appeared completely unaware of Ramsay<\/em>, thinking<\/a> a reference to “WT Ramsay” was a mistaken reference to the recent Upper Tier Tribunal Elizabeth Moyne Ramsay<\/a><\/em> case<\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n To be clear, most clients don’t want or need detailed technical advice. However in our view a reasonable tax lawyer should always provide advice as to the tax consequences of a transaction, particularly when it is an unusual one – even if the advice is highly summarised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We cannot explain the templated advice and lack of advice on key points. It is possible that there is detailed advice which all of our sources either missed or have mislaid. However, if that is wrong, it raises serious questions as to Mark Smith’s actions – the clients certainly believe<\/strong> they are receiving specific advice from a barrister.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So why aren’t they? <\/p>\n\n\n Good tax advice on complex structures always contains a discussion of risks, both under current law and the risk of change of law. In 2017, the Court of Appeal found an adviser negligent<\/a> for failing to warn of the risk of a structure, even when the advice was not itself negligent. This had the obvious effect of making risk warnings more common, even when tax advisers are looking at straightforward arrangements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n There are no risk warnings in the Cotswold Barristers (or Property118) advice we have seen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, the claim is made that their clients are “shielded from financial risk” because the barristers carry \u00a310m of professional indemnity insurance per client.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is highly misleading.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To access professional indemnity insurance, clients have to successfully sue the barrister for negligence, and that is not straightforward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n David Turner KC, an insurance specialist, was doubtful that Cotwold Barristers really carry \u00a310m of insurance “per client”. His view<\/a> was that the standard Bar Mutual policy’s “aggregation” clause meant that it would be \u00a310m per “originating cause”. If the Property118 structure is defective then that would likely be one “originating cause”, and the \u00a310m would therefore be shared by all 1000+ clients. Cotswold Barristers subsequently confirmed<\/a> that David Turner was correct (but tried to stop him publishing that confirmation).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The failure to warn clients of risks may itself amount to negligence. The false claims made about the insurance appear to make the situation more serious.<\/p>\n\n\n Barristers chambers usually<\/a> list<\/a> their<\/a> members<\/a> – the members being the whole point of the chambers. Cotswold Barristers is unusual in not doing this. It did at one point<\/a> – and included as part of its team a fake barrister<\/a> with a dubious past<\/a> who was jailed for conning a dying woman out of her life savings<\/a>.25<\/a><\/sup>There is no suggestion that Cotswold Barristers was aware of his actions, but Cotswold Barristers does appear to have been responsible for listing him as part of its team.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Cotswold Barristers’ correspondence address and registered office is an industrial unit at Cotswold airport<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The only barrister named in the advice sent to clients, or on the Cotswold Barristers website, is Mark Smith26<\/a><\/sup>Not to be confused with Mark Smith<\/a>, the respected extradition barrister.<\/span>. Smith is a generalist whose practice ranges from general business law, to copyright, to tax, to criminal defence work<\/a>, to private prosecutions (including one where he was suspended by a month by the Bar Standards Board for acting negligently<\/a> and “failing to act with reasonable competence<\/a>“). His profiles in 2017<\/a> and 2020<\/a> didn’t include tax in his areas of practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tax barristers usually train and practice in a “tax set” – a chambers entirely or partly dedicated to tax law. Mr Smith did not; indeed, in a discussion on LinkedIn<\/a>, it was not clear Mr Smith had heard the term \u201ctax set\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A core duty of barristers is maintaining their independence<\/a>. Cotswold Barristers Ltd is a director of Property118<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n On the basis of the documents we have reviewed, it seems plausible that the Property118 scheme fails because of poor implementation, leading to a failure to achieve the intended tax benefits, and significant additional up-front tax. It also seems plausible that Mark Smith and Cotswold Barristers have been serially negligent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Thanks to SH and D for their trust expertise, and J and K for their invaluable input and review. Thanks to David Turner KC for investigating the insurance position. Thanks to C for input on the indemnity\/interest points. Thanks to F and N for technical accounting input. Thanks to G and S for helping locate Property118 advice and documentation, and for their assistance with the technical analysis. Thanks, as ever, to S2 for specialist SDLT input and reviewing after publication. Thanks to James Robertson for the s284 point. Finally, thanks to Ray McCann for his original comments on the DOTAS analysis, and to Patrick Way KC for his insights on a Bell Howley Perrotton LLP podcast (recorded 8 November 2023; not yet broadcast).<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
A defective trust document<\/h2>\n\n\n
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\n\n\n\nWe have considered whether this could simply be a typo, and 2.4 should be read as meaning that the Property vests “absolutely and immediately in the Beneficiary<\/strong>“, but we don’t think that can be right. First, the property has already vested in the Beneficiary, so it doesn’t make sense to say that the Trustee can by notice vest it again. Second, it would be odd for the Trustee by notice to trigger its own loss of legal title. Third, the “or” clause at the end of the paragraph deals with the scenario where the Beneficiary has called for legal title; why would there be two subclauses doing the same thing? We therefore don’t believe the wording can be ignored, no matter how inconvenient it may be. The drafting is clearly a mistake from a tax perspective, but that doesn’t mean it can be ignored – there is, after all, commercial utility to enabling the landlord to unwind the structure at any time. It might be possible to make an application to the court for rectification on the basis there was a mistake of law and\/or mistake of tax law, but this would be far from straightforward<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
The misdrafted indemnity<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Incompetent advice on DOTAS<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Incompetent advice on mixed partnership rules<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Advice which is “templated” and fails to cover key points<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Missing advice<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Inappropriate attitude to risk<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Who are Cotswold Barristers?<\/h2>\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n
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